lunedì 7 dicembre 2015

Marine and the euro (I told you so).

( the international reader: you will find below the translation of my article published on August 23, 2011, on the pseudo-leftist journal "Il Manifesto". Here the Italian version in the pseudo-leftist blog "Sbilanciamoci" - a "Manifesto" spin-off. This article, written in response to the nonsensical blabbering of Rossana Rossanda (an icon of the Italian left), after providing four years in advance what is nowadays considered the consensus view on the causes of the crisis, forecast in an extremely accurate way a number of events that were considered extremely unlikely at that time: the substitution of Berlusconi with a "technical" government, the failure of this technical government, the failure of the German model, and, of course, the extraordinary success of the right-wing parties all across Europe, starting from France. ISIS has nothing to do with it: it's the euro, stupid!

An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday did not happen today.

I am definitely not an economist.


The soon-coming Euro exit

One year ago (in 2010, translator's note), I had been speaking with Aristide, a left-wing economist, when I asked a question similar to Ms. Rossanda's. Why do the Italian Left lay such a proud paternity claim over the Euro: couldn't they see how antagonistic it was to their constituency's interests?

Aristide’s answer made my blood run cold: "Dear Alberto, the costs of the Euro, as you imply, are well known. All textbooks clearly illustrate them. Our politicians have been well aware of them, but they could not reveal them to their supporters: for if their constituents had been able to weigh the costs and benefits, they would have never accepted the Euro. By keeping everyone in the dark they could act freely: they put all of us into a deadlock we would never be able to come out of, unless they did the right thing, that is, progress towards the complete fiscal and political union of Europe.” In short, they say: "The people don’t know what their interests are, however fortunately the Left does and will do what it sees just regardless of the people’s will". Or rather: I know that you can't swim and that, if I throw you in the water, you will drown. Therefore your only choice is to "freely decide" to do the right thing, namely, learn to swim. You can make this decision after a fair debate, based on the fact that I will take you unaware and push you in the water from behind.
Nice show of democracy for a liberal thinker!

Such chilling paternalism may seem more characteristic of Christian Democrats, but this isn’t so. "Worth is a kingdom, however acquired", says King Desiderius. I suppose the Catholic-bred Romano Prodi only read Manzoni's tragedy Adelchi up to here. Had he read any further, he would have found out that for the Catholic-bred Manzoni the Realpolitik has a tragic demise: the end does not justify the means after all.

The idea that "more Europe" is the solution to all evils is the real nemesis here. Yet, we cannot fully appreciate the futility of this claim without first analysing the true nature of the current crisis.

Public debt has nothing to do with it
The unanimity the Right and Left have shown in continuing to concentrate on public debt is quite disconcerting. Coming from the Right, this is no surprise: an ideological position opposing State intervention in the economy is at the core of theircounter-reformationthat followed the fall of the Berlin wall. This is clear to Ms. Rossanda. What she might have forgotten is that, before the Maastricht Treaty, no single economist had ever stated that the sustainability of a monetary union required compliance with public debt parameters (the 60% she mentioned). The “fiscal convergence” debate was born after Maastricht – reiterating that such parameters are nonsense. Maastricht is an ideological manifesto: less State (ergo, more market). But why even here (within the Left) does no one object to Maastricht? This conundrum is something Ms. Rossanda doesn't seem to notice nor question. If public debt had been the issue, from 2008 the crisis would have first hit Greece (with 110% debt/GNP ratio), then Italy (106%), Belgium (89%), France (67%) and Germany (66%) since other Eurozone countries had lower public debts. Instead, the crisis broke out first in Ireland (debt 44% of GNP), Spain (40%), Portugal (65%), and then only later in Greece and Italy. What did these countries have in common? Not public debt (it was lowest in the first affected countries and highest in the last ones), but inflation. The ECB had already warned in 2006 that inflation in Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain was not converging towards that of "virtuous" countries. The PIIGS were a different kind of club, apart from the Deutsche mark club (Germany, France, Belgium, etc.). And yes, here is the real problem: economists have known for a long time that different inflation rates in a monetary union will lead to a crisis of foreign debt (mostly private).

Inflation and foreign debt
If prices in country X rise faster than its partners’, X's exports will shrink and imports will soar – causing a balance of payments deficit. X's currency, required to buy X's goods, will be less in demand and its price will drop, that is, X devalues: its goods become affordable again, and the imbalance is relived. Countries in surplus are equally effected by this: their currency becomes scarce and revalues. However, if X is bound to its partners in a monetary union, currency prices cannot restore an external equilibrium, leaving only two options open: either X deflates, or its partners in surplus inflate. In Keynes' view both mechanisms are reciprocal: it is imperative to meet halfway, as surplus and deficit are two sides of the same coin (you can't be in surplus if nobody is in deficit). Cutbacks in deficit countries must be matched by the expansion of demand in surplus countries. The prevailing view is however asymmetrical: the only good inflation is zero inflation; surplus countries are "good" and it is the "bad" deficit countries that need to deflate in order to  converge towards the good ones. What if, like the PIIGS, they can't? Export revenues fall and imports must be financed with foreign debt. Countries with higher inflation rates have also been the ones that have accumulated the most foreign debt from 1999 to 2007: Greece (+78 GDP points), Portugal (+67), Ireland (+65) and Spain (+62). Along with debt, interest rates rise and the downward spiral begins: countries accumulate foreign debts to pay for foreign interests; imbalances swell and the crisis begins.

The spectre of 1992
So what about Italy? Ms. Rossanda says: "our debt is mostly domestic". That is no longer true. Do you really think markets care about who sleeps with Mr. Berlusconi? Do you think they worry if our public debt is too "high"? Our public debt has been over 100% for 20 years, and our public officials, though less colourful, have often been more unstable. These are not the markets' concerns: what is worrying is that today, like in 1992, our foreign debt is growing, and this growth, like in 1992, is driven by rising interest payments on foreign debt, which, for the most part, is private debt, incurred by families and enterprises (65% of foreign liabilities in Italy are from private sources).

Cui Prodest?
The political choice to remove exchange rate mechanisms, combinied with the asymmetrical ideologies of mercantilism ("good guys" should not co-operate) and monetarism (zero inflation), becomes a vehicle for class struggle. If the exchange rate is fixed, the burden of adjustment is dumped on the prices of goods, which can be lowered by either reducing costs (mainly labour costs, since that of raw materials is not up to us) or by increasing productivity. Job insecurity and wage reductions are just around the corner.

I pity any Leftist that supports the Euro but rejects Marchionne.

Those who fail to deflate the accumulation of foreign debt lead their country into crisis. Furthermore due to this external gap, the State will have to take on more debt (which is converted into public debt) in order to avoid the banks' collapse. Privatisation of profits is followed by the socialisation of losses, with the additional advantage of blaming the government's budget a posteriori. The choice is not whether to deflate, but how soon. It is a limited choice, but only because ideological idiocy focuses on the symptom (i.e. the public deficit – which can only be corrected by cutbacks), instead of the cause (external deficit – which could be corrected by co-operation). So the answer to Ms. Rossanda's question, "did we make a mistake?" is the one she gives herself: no, we didn't. The intended objective, namely "taming" the workforce, has been accomplished: it doesn’t sound very "left-wing", but if you are of the habit of labelling technocratic governments led by Christian Democrats as "left-wing", than go ahead. It's even stated in Acocella's manual: a "strong exchange rate" fosters discipline in workers' unions.

More Europe?
According to economic theory, a monetary union can stand without a wage crisis only if countries are fiscally integrated, as this facilitates the transfer of resources from those in expansion to those in recession. A downstream "solution" is to relieve the symptoms without curing the cause (external deficits). This is the notorious "more Europe" solution. For example: this year we celebrate the 150th anniversary of the monetary, fiscal and political union of Italy. We have had plenty of time to experience the "more Italy" approach, don't you think? Well, 150 years later, price convergence among the different regions is still incomplete, and the South holds a structural foreign debt 15% higher than its GDP, that is, it lives off of capital imports from the rest of the world (actually, from the rest of Italy). Fifty years of fiscal integration in a (monetarily) united Italy have brought us the green shirts in Padania. Give us ten years of fiscal integration in the Eurozone, maybe "Eurobonding" the whole way through, and we might see the brown shirts in Germany again. Fiscal integration is not politically sustainable because nobody likes paying for others, especially when the media, subordinate to the ideological asymmetry, keeps blasting the message that the others are lazy and unproductive and everything "is their fault". Whether they are Greeks, Turks or Jews, we know how it ends when it is somebody else's fault.

Deutschland über alles
If "downstream" solutions to external deficits are politically unsustainable, so are "upstream" ones. Cohabitation with the Euro would require abandoning the asymmetrical mercantilist ideology. Symmetrical incentives to realign should be envisaged for any country that deviates upwards or downwards from a given inflationary target. The co-ordination referred to by Ms. Rossanda should be built around this target. But the weight of "virtuous" countries won't allow it. Because the Euro is the result of two historical processes. Ms. Rossanda sees the first –capital's counter-attack to regain its slippage, caused by the postwar New Deal –but not the second: Germany's centuries-old struggle to secure a market for itself. Right and left, people are entranced by Germany's success, Europe's "driving force", which feeds its growth by intercepting demand from emerging countries. But what does the data say? From 1999 to 2007, Germany's surplus increased by 239 billion dollars, 156 billion in Europe alone, while its trade balance with China worsened by 20 billion (from a -4 deficit to a -24 one). Newspapers kept telling us that Germany’s exports to the East were sustaining our growth. Yet the data says otherwise. It was European demand, doped by a fixed exchange, which has been sustaining German growth. And Germany will not easily give up an asymmetry upon which it is fattening up. The question is, why were "peripheral" governments taken in by Germany? The answer is in Gandolfo's textbook: a single currency favours an "economic policy illusion", thus allowing public officials to pursue politically unacceptable objectives by saying they are imposed by superiors (how many times have we heard "Europe asks us...?). The end (class struggle in reverse) justified the means (becoming dependent on Germany).

Devaluation leads to blindness
It's a film we've already seen. Do you remember the "credible" EMS? From 1987 to 1991, European exchange rates were fixed. Inflation in Italy rose from 4.7% to 6.2%, while oil prices were dropping (wait, weren't fixed exchange rates supposed to restrain inflation?). Germany was cruising on at a 2% average. Italy's competitiveness was dwindling, foreign debt was growing, and, after the 1991 US recession, Italy was forced to devalue. Devaluation! Try saying this word to a left-wing intellectual. He will blush with outraged virginal modesty. It's not his fault. For decades he's been bombarded with the message that devaluation is one of those dirty things that cause a temporary, sterile relief, and horrible long-term damages. It's no wonder that a German-led system should stand on Goebbles' principle: repeat a lie often enough and it will become truth. What actually happened after 1992? Inflation dropped half a point in '93 and another half in '94. The foreign debt/GDP ratio halved in five years (from -12 to -6 GDP points). The energy bill improved (from -1.1 to -1.0 points). After an initial shock, Italy grew an average 2% from 1994 to 2001. The warnings against the use of devaluation (it generates inflation, it only causes temporary relief, we cannot afford it because we are oil importers…) are false.

It is said that devaluation can’t be the solution and that no exit procedures are provided, so... So what? Who is so naive as not to see that the lack of exit procedures is just a rhetorical device whose purpose is to entrench in the public the idea that what is occurring is "natural" or "technical" while in fact, it is just a political choice made by humans (and therefore reversible by definition)? Sure, with devaluation foreign currency debts would be more burdensome. But we would also turn from being foreign debtors to being foreign creditors, thus generating sufficient resources to pay off debts – like what happened in 1992. And if this wasn't enough, we would still have the option to default. Mr. Prodi wants "major institutional investors" to foot part of the bill? Well, the most direct way to do it is not issuing Eurobonds or “socialising” losses to Germany's benefit (with the brown shirts looming in the background), but to declare, if necessary, default, as many countries have done before without being erased from the world economic map. It's already happened and it will happen again. "The markets will punish us, we will be crushed!" Nonsense. Italy has grown for decades without resorting to foreign savings. Only thanks to the Euro, which crushed families' incomes and therefore savings, has our country been forced to run up foreign debts. Gross national savings, stable around 21% from 1980 to 1999, have been constantly dropping since then, reaching 16% of income. In the same period, financial liabilities of households have doubled from 40% to 80%. Remove the Euro, and Italy will need outside markets less, while these same markets will continue to need 60 million Italian consumers.

Let not the Left-wing do what the Right-wing doeth
We will exit the Euro, because in the end Germany will saw off the branch on which it is sitting. It is up to the Left to realize and manage this process, lest it ends up getting crushed. I'm not talking about the next elections. Berlusconi will go: ten years in the Eurozone have created such tensions that now the social butcher shop must start working at full capacity. And this blood splatter will clash less with a red apron. The Realpolitik Left will once again be allowed to manage the situation, because according to another economic policy illusion, typical right-wing policies are more acceptable if done by professed lefties. But citizens are starting to realize that the social butcher shop can only be closed by exiting the Euro. Dear Ms. Rossanda, workers are not "upset", as you say: they are just discerning. "Sin, shame, evil — they cannot be hidden!", says the evil spirit to Gretchen. Thus, after twenty years of Realpolitik, left-wing politicians find themselves again treading water in the deep end, squeezed between the need to revere finance, and to justify to their constituency a fascist choice, not so much for its class consequences, but rather for the condescending way in which it was imposed. Furthermore, they expose themselves to the encroachments of the various Marine Le Pens coming forward in more mature democracies, and soon also in ours. Because, in the long run, right-wing policies only benefit the Right. That said, I am under the opinion our current politicians won’t have so much heartache, both right and left, in a country where serving just one legislative term is enough to win you a golden pension. That might explain the unanimity of views.

('ve made your euro. Now you sleep with Marine...)

26 commenti:

  1. Suppongo, correggetemi se sbaglio, che la rottura per quanto auspicabile e inevitabile, ponga in essere numerosi problemi da "gestire"...Attenderanno che la Le Pen glieli butta addosso o inizieranno la dissoluzione anticipatamente ? Certo resta l'ipotesi, "non la facciamo governare" quanto sarebbe fattibile ? Saluti da Napoli (e sempre grazie Prof.)

  2. Potete scommettere che il tentativo di far sparire dalla circolazione del sistema monetario francese la quantita' di euro necessaria comincera' il giorno successivo alla proclamazione della Presidenza le Pen. Potete anche scommettere che alcune discrete telefonate alle varie cancellerie europee rammenteranno di far presente all BCE che si trova di fronte a numerose testate nucleari, e la domanda "Quante divisioni ha Draghi ? " sara' certamente parafrasata nei corridoi dell'Eliseo. Puoi fare il bullo con la non lo farei con la Francia.

  3. Sempre interessante andare a sfogliare gli archivi dei giornali...

    Bagnai scriveva quest'articolo il 23 Agosto 2011, e prevede la sostituzione di Berlusconi. Un paio di settimane prima, 11 Agosto, il mitico Mario Monti scrive un editoriale sul Corriere a cui assegnano un titolo fantastico (col senno di poi): "il podestà straniero", in cui -udite udite- Monti in pratica riconosce la necesserietà ed utilità che " le decisioni principali sono state prese da un «governo tecnico sopranazionale» e, si potrebbe aggiungere, «mercatista», con sedi sparse tra Bruxelles, Francoforte, Berlino, Londra e New York.", però il Nostro si lamenta...

    Scrive "vedo anche, in una precipitosa soluzione eterodiretta come quella dei giorni scorsi, [] inconvenienti." Tra i quali "scarsa dignità" e "downgrade politico".

    Eh certo, il podstà straniero non va bene… Molto meglio uno nostrano. Lui.

    1. Due precisazioni: l'articolo venne inviato l'8 agosto e tenuto 15 giorni fermo dalla redazione (sperando che si notasse di meno). Il podestà straniero era ovviamente Monti!


  5. Dopo una due-giorni scaldacuore (e cervello) consistente in un blitz fiorentino per sentire Bagnai in un covo di comunisti e, per l'occasione, rivedere varie "cose" della città, gustare un panino con copioso lampredotto e salutare alcuni amici-conoscenti di blog; dopo uno stimolante giro in carrozzella munita di cavallo, guidatore e preziosa guida ambientale nel parco di San Rossore, Pisa, compresa l'ampia tenuta presidenziale e compreso il disvelamento inerente le misteriose denominazioni Fiume morto Nuovo e Fiume morto Vecchio, nonché il compiacimento della guida quando ho ricordato l'innamoramento del Carducci per la regina Elena, che - appreso dalla guida - usufruiva di un ponticello appositamente costruito
    per soddisfare la sua inclinazione alla pesca con la canna (i maschi di qui non si sganascino a trovare e gustare doppi sensi peraltro da me accuratamente disseminati, pur rispettando la lettera del racconto). Dopo tutto ciò, il mio non vecchio cuore (gulp) e il mio normale, spero, cervello esultano al titolo del quotidiano locale, cioè non toscano, recitante "Il Fronte conquista la Francia".

    Aggiungiamo che sono stata appena riconosciuta e festeggiata da un'ex alunna - forse festeggiante proprio perché ex - e si capiranno i motivi del presente inno gioiso in forma di prosa, ancorché privo di musica.

    Buona giornata ai conoscenti-amici fiorentini e a quelli arrivati cola' per il medesimo motivo mio.

    Per chi c'era: singolarmente privi di spirito la giovane, e il giovane in suo soccorso, facenti notare che "è la stessa battuta di Berlusconi" il consiglio di trovarsi una compagna ricca.
    Veramente, con questi ascoltatori non vinceremo mai.

    1. colgo l'occasione per salutarti, Adriana,sono contenta di averti conosciuta.
      A proposito di giovani, hai ragione: pur apprezzando il fatto che fossero presenti, quindi verosimilmente interessati all'argomento, hanno accolto in modo sbagliato l'uscita di Bagnai.
      Attribuisco questo ad una mancanza di conoscenza del Prof, in particolare del suo lato "crotaliano" nonchè ironico.

  6. Dove sono finiti i grandi statisti? Guardiamo a casa nostra chi sono stati ed oggi sono i riferimenti. Mi taccio non per paura ma perchè non mi va di parlare di gente mediocre ed indegna.

  7. I partiti della "sinistra" italiani hanno per anni aspettato il sostegno improbabile dei compagni europei nella lotta contro la Merkel cattiva; prima Hollande, poi i socialdemocratici tedeschi, poi Tsipras. Conosciamo tutti come queste aspettative siano state sonoramente deluse. Non vorrei che qualcun'altro, da destra, speri nei camerati d'oltralpe per un'uscita "da destra". Temo potrebbero rimanere delusi.

    1. @davide piva

      Ti sfugge un piccolo dettaglio: che Marine Lepen proclama un giorno sì e l'altro pure che il problema E' l'euro; ti sfugge che usa ampiamente ciò che scrive Jacques Sapir (al quale è stato malevolmente fatto notare); ti sfugge che sostiene che la mondializzazione è far produrre merci a degli schiavi per poi venderla a dei disoccupati, e così via. Detto questo, mi piange il cuore che io stia qui non dico a prendere le difese di Marine Lepen, ma semplicemente a constatare dei fatti: che MAI NESSUNO a sinistra ha detto cose simile. E tralascio il discorso sulla nazione che è la condizione necessaria per cominciare qualsiasi riflessione su euro ed Europa. Noi non speriamo nell'uscita "da destra", la "speranza" è una categoria che Tucidide ci ha insegnato a non prendere in considerazione (se qualcuno avesse voglia di leggere: V,113, fa parte del dialogo tra gli Ateniesi e i Melii). Teniamo in considerazione dei fatti, ascoltiamo dei dibattiti, leggiamo dei programmi. Poi osserviamo i fatti e ne tiriamo delle conclusioni, pronti a ricrederci senza rincrescimento. E temo che queste mie osservazioni siano quelle di gran parte di quei sette milioni (spero di non sbagliare) di disoccupati francesi.

    2. Grazie Celso. Il commento era così superficiale da non meritare risposta. L'ho pubblicato per evidenziare i danni di una certa tendenziosa disinformazione. La Francia è l'unico paese dove un partito ha posto la questione sociale al centro del dibattito. Perché altrove non sia successo qui ci è abbastanza chiaro, come pure perché non potesse succedere "a sinistra". Peccato.

    3. @davive piva
      Semmai è il contrario: sono i "camerati d'oltralpe" che sembrano avere le idee chiare e sperano che qualcuno nella penisola segua il loro esempio. E temono anche di rimanere delusi...
      Vedi questa intervista, e nello specifico la risposta a questa domanda:
      Quali altri partiti tiene d'occhio?
      «Voglio capire cosa farà la Lega. Non si sa bene che strada voglia prendere, in passato sull’Europa ha avuto una linea ambigua».

      Ahh la storia! Che non si ripete mai uguale...

    4. C'è stato un misunderstading. A me il messaggio di Le Pen è chiaro; da europeo, sono andato su youtube ad ascoltarmi le sue interviste e le sue dichiarazioni in lingua originale. Una delle parole più spesso ripetute è "sovranità" (o piuttosto il ri-appropiarsene), quale principio cardine da cui ripartire per risollevare il paese. Il mio è un auspicio che, in caso di vittoria elettorale, il programma sovranista sia messo in pratica. Il mio timore non nasce dalla titubanza o dall'ambiguità della Le Pen, quanto dalla conoscenza della forza degli apparati della burocrazia unionista nel reprimere comportamenti non-allineati.

  8. An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday did not happen today.

    I am definitely not an economist.


    Prof,che altro aggiungere?
    Alla faccia loro. Pace e bene.

  9. ricorderò sempre con piacere anche questo articolo

  10. Ma 'sta roba qua:

    è colpa della Marine?

    Origina di qua magari? Orrore!
    Papyrus deed of sale of a slave boy (P. Lond. I 229), with original seals, Syria, 24 May 166, Papyrus 229

    Questo forse?

    Non so. Ottimi spunti per confondere ulteriormente il piddino che, come già certo sapete, non ragiona con i numeri e nega l'evidenza, ma davanti alle immagini tace, miracolosamente. Se tace magari pensa.

  11. E nel frattempo:

    "Banca Marche, in 40mila hanno perso tutto"

    "A FERRARA la situazione è pesantissima: da giorni tensioni nelle filiali, minacce e persino danni alle auto di dipendenti."

    La fonte è il quotidiano Il Resto del Carlino che qui nella "bassa" è in assoluto il quotidiano più diffuso (una via di mezzo tra la Pravda e Der Angriff).

    E come spiegava la situazione ai suoi lettori (tra cui ci sono quelli che hanno perso tutto) lo stesso quotidiano PRIMA della legnata? Così:

    Pesaro, 22 novembre 2015 - Banca Marche è salva.

    Tanto da far esultare la commissaria europea alla concorrenza, Margrethe Vestager, che ha contributo fortemente a costringere il governo e Bankitalia a questa decisione: «È cruciale che siano azionisti e creditori subordinati a farsi carico dei costi e delle perdite dei fallimenti bancari piuttosto che i contribuenti».

    L'ultima frase, "piuttosto che i contribuenti" è un vero colpo di genio.


    1. E' uno dei fortissimamente voluti "dividendi" dell'euro, il quale sono certo viene considerato "solo una moneta" da buona parte dei neofalliti (mi ci gioco la nuova esenzione imu di Renzi) correntisti chiamati al tavolo della procedura concorsuale non come creditori quali sono in effetti ma con le stesse attribuzioni di responsabilità del portatore di capitale, ovvero il rischio sistemico di perdere quanto investito.
      "Capita" a volte quando la banca dipende dalla PMI che a sua volta dipende dalla domanda interna che a sua volta viene strangolata dal dividendo dell'euro, di cui sopra.
      Del resto il creditore forte (la banca), oltre ad essere tutelato dalla prelazione della legge fallimentare sul recupero del credito suo e dalla posizione istituzionale di contraente forte, è già capitato storicamente che facesse melina strategica su certe questioni dirimenti, come il dissesto.
      Ricordo l'affaire dei bond argentini (anche qui c'entra "il dividendo" dell'aggancio monetario). I direttori di banca telefonavano ai loro clienti migliori "Ho un grosso affare! rendimenti al 10%, investimento sicuro, sa si tratta di obbligazioni!" e il cliente si beveva tutto, facendo smobilizzare il portafoglio al manager.
      Così, mentre l'affare si ingrossava vieppiù, il cliente contento del rendimento da "dividendo", rigorosamente entre guillemets, si preparava a divenire il nuovo povero che scontava il rischio del portatore di capitale e dell'investitore qualificato.
      Quanti di questi furono sconsigliati nell'acquisto e vennero poi a lamentarsi e a denunziare di intraprendere le vie legali ho perso il numero.
      Ieri come oggi, la cultura forse non paga tutti i sabati ma l'ignoranza è un debito congenito che prima o poi si manifesta inevitabilmente.

  12. A Marine servirà un buon servizio d'ordine. In questo periodo il pack Coq è un colabrodo...

  13. Mi scusi professore ma come mai la Francia sta collassando come l'Italia e gli altri paesi PIGS ? E' solo l'aggancio alla moneta più forte che la sta massacrando? I suo fondamentali economici non erano simili a quelli della Germania?

    1. E dove l'avrei detto? Aiutate il nostro amico? Non ha capito dov'è capitato ma mi sembra in buona fede.

    2. Puoi guardare qui o qui ma soprattutto qui .
      Se cerchi nei vecchi post trovi materiale di studio a volontà.

  14. The Marines and the euro (they will tell her so).


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